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A growing body of evidence suggests that corruption is one of the major 
causes of environmental degradation in developing countries. The large rents 
associated with resource extraction can be used to evade environmental regulations in 
a number of ways, with significant economic and environmental costs (World Bank 
1997, Callister, 1999).  For instance, the surpluses can be used to influence policies 
through the payment of political contributions to policy makers (Ascher 1999).   
Alternatively, environmental regulations can be evaded by paying bribes to lower 
level bureaucrats who are responsible for administering policies (Desai 1998).  
Despite growing evidence of different forms of corruption, the existing 
environmental policy literature has neglected the problem of stratified corruption, and 
has focused mainly upon the economic and environmental consequences of bribes 
paid to policy makers (Fredriksson (1997),(1999), (2001)).  This paper attempts to 
augment this literature by examining corruption in the political and administrative 
branches of government.  We also examine the effects of political competition on the 
different forms of corruption.  While there is general acceptance in the literature that 
political competition reduces corruption (Treisman (2000), Deacon (2002), Rose 
Ackerman (1999), Johnston (1999), Jain (2001) and World Bank (1997,2000)), there 
is little formal modelling to support this conjecture.  This paper attempts to address 
this issue in a model of stratified corruption.
1 
We adopt the definitions proposed by the World Bank (2000), and distinguish 
between “grand” and “petty” corruption.  The former is defined as an attempt to 
influence the setting of policy by making payments to politicians, while the latter 
reflects payments made in an attempt to avoid the consequences of a given policy.  It 
                                                 
1 Recent empirical work by the World Bank has begun to look at grand and petty corruption separately 
(See World Bank, 2000; Hellman et al., 2000).     1
is clear that grand corruption will impinge on the setting of policy, while petty 
corruption will determine the level of compliance.  Both issues are important when 
evaluating the effectiveness of environmental policy. 
We consider a polluting firm which can adopt one or both of the following 
strategies to minimise the costs associated with environmental policy.  First, it can 
make contributions to political parties  in return for more favourable policy outcomes 
(grand corruption). A second strategy is to avoid compliance with policy by bribing an 
inspector to under-report emission levels (petty corruption).  We evaluate the effects 
of political competition on environmental and policy outcomes, and examine its role 
in the elimination of petty and grand corruption.  It is shown that increasing political 
competition will yield more stringent policy and better environmental outcomes.  In 
addition, political competition may lead to lower levels of petty corruption, however 
this is not assured.  In particular, if enforcement mechanisms and judicial institutions 
are weak, rather than promoting less petty corruption, a more competitive political 
system induces an increase in both non-compliance and the bribe paid to downstream 
bureaucrats.  We also find that even under intense political competition, grand 
corruption may persist.  In particular, when the welfare cost of environmental damage 
is sufficiently high, the policies of political parties converge.  Policy convergence 
allows the political parties  to minimise the political costs associated with neglecting 
public welfare and  thus insulates them from the effects of political competition.  
These results are arguably of considerable policy significance, particularly in 
the formation of global reform programs designed to combat corruption.  Corruption 
is usually defined as the “use of public office for private gain” (World Bank 1997, 
Bardhan, 1997).  Our analysis suggests the need for a more precise definition of 
corruption that takes account of the economic effects of bribery.  Since political   2
competition may lead to both policy improvements and higher bribes being paid, the 
results suggests that there is no necessary relationship between the level of bribery 
(i.e. the degree of rent extraction, or abuse of public office for private gain) and the 
resulting economic distortions.  Depending on the level of political competition, 
corruption may simply lead to a transfer of rents, rather than policy distortions. This 
finding has implications for the way in which corruption is defined and measured by 
organisations such as the World Bank and Transparency International, which focus on 
subjective measures of the amount of money paid in bribes.  
This paper combines elements from two distinct strands of literature: 
environmental policy models of grand corruption and principal-agent models of 
administrative corruption.  The grand corruption component of the model is most 
closely related to the work of Fredriksson (1997, 1999, 2001), which has its origins in 
Grossman and Helpman (1994).  However, our model extends upon this literature in 
two important ways.  First, we explore the possibility that political competition acts to 
constrain the corrupt behaviour of policy makers and second,  the model endogenises 
the weight that policy makers place upon social welfare when determining optimal 
policies.  The petty corruption component of the model is related to the work of 
Border and Sobel (1995) and  Damania (2002).
2   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides an 
overview of the model and derives the equilibrium properties.  Section 3, examines 
the effects of political competition on bribes,  policies and compliance levels.  Section 
4 provides some concluding remarks and discussion.    
 
                                                 
2  A similar literature on tax evasion includes, Mookherjee and Png (1995) and Chander and Wilde 
(1992).   3
2. The  Model 
In this section we present a model in which a polluting firm seeks to evade 
regulations either by bribing politicians who determine policies (i.e. grand corruption), 
and/or bribing bureaucrats who administer policies (i.e. petty corruption).  For 
simplicity we focus on the case of a single firm that discharges pollution, which is 
controlled through an emissions tax.
3  The analysis is based on the following sequence 
of events.  
There are two political parties i and j who compete for power.  In the first 
stage the polluting firm simultaneously offers each political party a bribe, or 
contribution schedule.  This consists of a continuous function that maps every policy 
vector that each party might choose into a specific political contribution or bribe.  In 
stage 2 given knowledge of the firm’s contribution schedule offered to it, each party 
announces its optimal policies.  Once policies have been announced, an election or 
political struggle occurs, and the winner of the political struggle implements the 
announced policy vector.  Finally, given knowledge of the policy settings, the firm and 
an inspector who administers the tax, interact and bargain over the level of 
compliance and the bribe that will be paid.   
Figure 1 provides an overview of the game and the sequence of events.  The 
model is solved by backwards induction, hence we begin by describing the firm 
inspector interaction. 
                                                 
3 While the results here hold for any form of environmental regulation, we use an emissions tax for 
reasons of simplicity.  Further, as noted in Fredriksson (2001) many countries use this as the instrument 
of choice to deal with environmental problems.   4
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2.1 Firm –Inspector Interaction 
Consider a firm (ƒ) which as a result of its production process, discharges emissions 
(e).  These emissions result in environmental damage D(e), with  '0 a n d' '0 DD >> .   
For simplicity, production costs are assumed to be zero. 
To combat the problem of environmental damage, the government can levy a 
tax (t) on each unit of emissions.  An informational asymmetry exists such that the 
government must rely on the services of an inspector (m) to report pollution levels.  In 
return for a fixed wage (w), the inspector reports the level of emissions of the firm to 
the government.  The tax is thus levied on the level of emissions reported by the 
inspector.  
In order to reduce its tax burden, the firm may offer a bribe (B), to the 
inspector to induce a report of emission levels ê ≤ e.  This form of bribery is referred 
to as ‘petty’ corruption.  The level of under-reporting is defined by v = (e – ê),  ê ≤ e.
4    
The government can commission an audit to deter non-compliance.  The 
probability of being audited is given as σ(ê),  σ∈(0,1),  with,  '0 ;' '0 σσ <> , which 
implies that the probability of being audited is ceteris paribus higher (lower) when the 
level of reported emissions is lower (higher).  This audit rule is consistent with 
previous literature which demonstrates that the optimal audit frequency is declining in 
the report (see for example, Border and Sobel (1995), Damania (2002)).  With 
probability,  η the audit uncovers the actual level of emissions and leads to a 
successful prosecution of both the firm and the inspector.  The parameter η captures 
two practical problems associated with the enforcement of environmental regulation:  
                                                 
4 We exclude the possibility that the level of reported emissions could be higher than actual emissions 
(ê>e). This implies that if required, the firm can provide incontrovertible evidence of emission levels, 
thus precluding extortion by the inspector.   6
the ability of the policy maker to detect cheating and the ability of the legal system to 
convict guilty offenders (i.e. the efficiency of the judiciary).  Both are of relevance, 
especially in developing countries, where evidence of polluting activities is often 
difficult to obtain (for example, due to the activity being undertaken in a remote 
location) and where the judicial infrastructure is weak and underdeveloped.  The 
expected probability of a conviction is thus defined by: λ(ê) = σ(ê)η.  The expected 
fine payable is:  () () () ()
g ˆ     , ,   
g E Fe h v g f , m λθ ==
; where 
g θ  is the fine rate on 
agent g = m, f  and  ˆ vee =− is the  level of non-compliance.  It is assumed that 
22 2 2 0, 0  ;  0,  0 hh h v h v θθ ∂ ∂ >∂∂>∂ ∂ >∂∂ > .  The latter assumption implies that 
the penalty is increasing in the degree of non-compliance (i.e. ‘the punishment fits the 
crime’). 
We begin by establishing the equilibrium bribe and reported level of 
emissions.   In considering its prospective bribe, the firm must consider the benefits 
from reducing its tax burden and the expected costs of non-compliance.  Let gross 
profits when a bribe is paid be given by π(e) = P(e)e, where P(e) is the price of the 
good.
5  Further, let B  be the bribe paid to the inspector, and  ˆ e be the resulting 
reported emissions level.  The emission tax paid by the firm on reported emissions is 
t ˆ e.  It follows that the payoffs to the firm from corrupt behaviour are given by: 
() ˆ () ( ,)
ff eB t eh v πλ θ −+ + .  On the other hand, if the firm complies with regulations 
and correctly report emissions, gross profits are given by π(e
h) = P(e
h)e
h and the 
payoffs from compliance are: π(e
h) - te
h.   Thus the expected gains to the firm from 
bribery are:
6 
                                                 
5 Notice that production and abatement costs are ignored and one unit of output results in one unit of 
emissions. 
6 For notational brevity, the arguments of λ are ignored.   7
f Ψ= () ( ) ( ) ˆ () ( ,)
ff h h eB t eh v et e πλ θ π    −+ + − −               (1a) 
The inspector faces a similar trade off. The payoffs from accepting a bribe 
are: () ,
mm wB h v λθ  +−  .  Hence the expected gains from bribery are: 
() ,
mm m wB h v w λθ  Ψ= +− −        ( 1 b )  
Taking the tax and penalty rates as given, reported and actual emissions are 
chosen to maximise the expected joint payoffs from the bribe: 
( )
m f Ψ + Ψ ≡
e , e ˆ J Max          (2)   
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m.  Note that equation (3a) specifies that in equilibrium, reported 
emissions are set such that the marginal cost of compliance (i.e. the marginal rate of  
tax) is equated to the marginal expected cost of non-compliance (i.e. the expected 
marginal fine).  By equation (3b) actual emissions are determined by equating 
marginal revenue from production with the marginal expected penalty.  
The equilibrium bribe is determined by a Nash bargain between the firm and 
the inspector, where both are assumed to have equal bargaining power.  This implies 
that the firm and the inspector share equally the benefits from corruption.  The bribe is 
determined by the following Nash bargain, 
( )
m f Ψ Ψ
B Max        (4) 
Using (1a) and (1b), the equilibrium bribe is given as: 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
hh 1 ˆ Be e t e e , ,
2
ff m m hv hv ππ λ θ θ  =− + − − −   (5)   8
To ensure that higher fines always reduce the equilibrium bribe, the following 
regularity condition is adopted: 
fm hh > .  This assumption requires that penalties on 
the bribe giver are more severe than those on the recipient.
 7   
Appendix A summarises some useful equilibrium properties of the firm–
inspector interaction.  It is shown that: (i) An increase in the tax rate will reduce the 
level of emissions (property 2).  This occurs because higher taxes raise costs and thus 
lower production and pollution levels.  (ii) However, a higher tax will increase the 
level of under-reporting (property 3).  Intuitively, since a higher tax raises the payoffs 
from tax evasion, the level of non-compliance rises. We also show that, (iii) an 
increase in the fine decreases the level of emissions (property 5) and (iv) reduces the 
level of under-reporting (property 6).  The latter occurs because higher fines dilute the 
gains from bribery and thus induce greater levels of compliance. 
 
2.2  Political Equilibrium: Grand Corruption and Political Competition 
Having examined the firm-inspector outcome, attention is now turned to the 
political equilibrium. There are two political parties i and j who compete for political 
power.  Consistent with Grossman and Helpman (1994), Aidt (1998) and Fredriksson 
(1997), the firm lobbies policy makers in each party by offering political contributions 
that are contingent upon announced policies.  In contrast to previous work, our 
lobbying model incorporates political competition and also allows the firm to lobby 
both parties in the electoral contest.
8   
                                                 
7 To see why this is necessary note that an increase in the marginal fine on the inspector may increase 
the level of the bribe.  To see this, consider the case where the marginal fine increases and 
m m f f h h θ ∂ ∂ < θ ∂ ∂ .  Provided (1a) remains positive, the firm will simply offer a larger bribe to the 
inspector in order to compensate her for the greater expected loss.    
8 These features represent an extension of the standard common agency model of environmental 
lobbying (see, e.g. Fredriksson (1997)).   9
  Politicians value the political contributions received from lobby groups and the 
rewards of winning power.  Ceteris paribus, the probability that a party wins the 
political contest is increasing in the level of welfare that voters expect to receive from 
the party’s announced policies.  Accordingly the level of aggregate welfare is defined 
as the sum of all agents utility in the model:
9 




     (6) 
where C(θ) represents the costs of administering the penalty and judicial regime with 
'0 C > and  '' 0 C > and  D(e)is environmental damage which is increasing and convex 
in emissions () '0 ,' '0 DD >> . 
Let ρ(W
i,W
j)∈ (0,1) be the policy dependent level of support for party i.  The 
following reasonable assumptions are made, which are consistent with the literature 


























10 These assumptions imply that support for party i increases when it 
announces welfare improving policies, and decreases when its rival does the same.  
Concavity of ρ in W
i  (and convexity
 in W
j) captures the idea of diminishing marginal 
political returns to welfare enhancing policies.   
We further allow for the possibility that the political contest may be influenced 
by possible ideological bias.  Without loss, assume that voters have a preference for 
                                                 








− ∫ e e P de e P
e
0
, the firm’s profits ((P(e)-t)e), the 
government’s revenue from the tax, the cost of imposing fines (C(θ)) and environmental damage (D(e)). 
Taxes and contributions paid by the firm are received by the government, the wage received by the 
inspector is paid by the government and the firm pays bribes received by the inspector.  These 
obviously cancel out in aggregate.   Aggregate welfare is increasing in both the tax and the marginal 
fine.   10
party i which is captured by a parameter α ∈[0, 1]
11 12.  The probability that party i 
wins the political struggle is thus given by:  () (1 ) ( , )
ij WW αα ρ Ω≡ + − .  Similarly, 
the probability that party j wins the election is:  () (1 ) 1 (1 ) ( , )
ij WW αα ρ  −Ω = − + −  .  
Thus, the probability of electoral success of each party is to some degree determined 
by the welfare implications of their policies.   The policy dependent level of support 
for party i is given by ρ(W
i,W
j)∈ (0,1). However, this is tempered by the ideological 
bias for party i (α∈(0,1)).  A high bias in favour of party i has the effect of lowering 
the importance of gaining political support by adopting welfare enhancing policies.  
Recall the sequence of events in the model. First, the firm makes policy 
contingent contributions to both political parties.  Following this, the parties announce 
their tax and penalty rate to maximise expected utility.  After the announcement of 
policies, an election occurs.  It is assumed that the victor of the political struggle 
faithfully implements its policies.
13  Each political party announces an emission tax 
policy ( , ,
k tki j = )and penalty policy ( , ,
k ki j θ = ) to maximise expected utility.
14 The 
expected utility to each party from winning office is: 
() ,
ii i i GR S t θ =Ω +      ( 7 a )  
[] 1( , )
jj j j GR S t θ =− Ω +     (7b) 
                                                                                                                                            
10 There is a significant literature regarding the nature of political competition  (see for example: Downs 
(1957), Romer (1975), Roemer (2002), Johnson (1988), Grofman (1993)).  In this paper, the exact 
details of the political struggle are not explicitly modelled.   
11  Grossman and Helpman (1996) also model political bias in a similar manner. 
12 In this model ideological bias is used to measure a party’s  ability to avoid the political effect of its 
policies.  For example, it may measure incumbency bias, ethnic preferences or  the effectiveness of a 
party  in preventing certain groups from voting, or the ability to rig an election outcome.  
13 An important side issue is the assumption that politicians do not renege on their promises.  In a one 
shot game, there exists a motive to implement policies which diverge from those promised.  This default 
could be against the firm (different policy once contributions are accepted) or against the public at large 
(different policy after the political struggle is fought and won).   As noted by Grossman and Helpman 
(1996), honestly implementing policies can be motivated in a repeated game where credible 
punishments are imposed on agents who break promises. 
14  The analysis could be extended to also include an audit policy or a prosecution policy.  However, for 
brevity we focus on only one aspect of compliance policy.  This may also be justified on the grounds   11
where  R denotes the exogenous returns to being in office. S
k(t
k,θ
k) are the 





 15  Thus, the weight apportioned to general welfare vis 
à vis contributions will be determined by Ω which captures the political costs 
associated with abandoning the public interest.  These costs are determined in the 
model by the political bias and the responsiveness of the electorate to changes in 
environmental policy.  For simplicity, R is set to zero when a party is not in office.   
Observe that equations (7a) and (7b) are based on the assumption that political 
contributions convey private benefits to the recipients, but have no effect on the 
outcome of the political struggle.  This is consistent with a large volume of empirical 
work examining the effect of campaign spending on outcomes.  Most find spending 
by the incumbent government has no significant effect on electoral prospects (e.g. 
Glantz et al (1976); Erikson and Palfrey (1993), Levitt (1994)).  Similarly,  Schulze 
and Ursprung  (2001) and Grossman and Helpman (1994) argue that political 
contributions are used by lobbyists to influence policy positions, rather than the 
election outcome.   
  Maximising (7a) and (7b) yields the following first order conditions: 





















α   
ii i Φ t, θ =  (8a) 





















α   
jj j Φ t, θ =  (8b)
16 
                                                                                                                                            
that judicial changes involve institutional reforms that are slow to undertake and uncertain in their 
impacts while our focus is on predictable short run policies. 
15 Φ is adopted to represent either the tax rate or the marginal fine for notational brevity. 
16 Having derived the first order conditions, we can provide an heuristic argument of the assumption 
that the welfare maximising policy level will never be exceeded.  Let α=0 and assume that the parties 
make no contributions.  The parties will maximise (9a) and (9b) by setting policy to maximise political 
support.  This involves setting policy at the welfare maximising level.  Contributions are only made by 
the firm in return for more favourable policy outcomes.  It thus follows that in the presence of grand 
corruption, policy is set below the welfare maximising rate.  Thus W′(Φ)>0.   12
Equations (8a) and (8b) reveal that in each party, policies are determined by equating 
the politically relevant marginal  benefits and costs.  Thus, each party sets its policy 
such that the marginal benefit in the form of a greater bribe is equated to the marginal 
political cost of the policy, which is defined by the change in the probability of losing 
power.  Ceteris paribus the greater the welfare loss from a policy change, the greater 
will be the probability of losing power to a rival and hence the higher are the political 
costs of the policy.  Accordingly, in equilibrium the weight given to the welfare costs 
of a policy is determined endogenously by the intensity of political competition.  This 
contrasts with the standard common agency lobbying model where the weight given to 
social welfare is assumed to be exogenous. 
Totally differentiating the system of equations in (8a) and (8b) yields the 
slopes of each party’s policy reaction function, which is given by: 







>>       ( 9 )  
Thus under political competition, policies are strategic complements.   
Intuitively, as the second mover political parties take contributions/bribes as given.  If  
party i sets more stringent policies, this increases its chances of electoral success.  
This compels a rival seeking power to also raise the stringency of its policies.  Thus, 
in general, electoral competition tends to induce policies to move in the same 
direction.   
  In the first stage of the game the firm determines contributions by maximising 
its expected payoffs (equation (8)), taking account of the political parties optimal 
responses and the anticipated interaction with the inspector.  The expected payoffs to 
the firm from lobbying are: 
(1 ) ( , ) ( , )
f ij i i i j j j US t S t θθ =Ω Π + −Ω Π − −       (10)   13
where  Π
k k = i, j is defined as: ( ) ( )
k k f k k k k k k v f B e t e e P , ˆ θ λ − − − = Π  are profits 
under policies of party k. 
The first-order conditions from maximising equation (10) are:  








  ∂Φ ∂Π Φ ∂Π
Ω+ − + − Ω + − − =   ∂∂ Φ Φ ∂ Φ  
    (11a) 








  ∂Φ ∂Π Φ ∂Π
− Ω +− + Ω +− − =   ∂∂ Φ Φ ∂ Φ  
    (11b) 













ij A=Π −Π . 
Equations (11a) and (11b) imply that the firm pays contributions to each party, for 
each policy, to equate the expected marginal benefits from a policy change to the 
marginal costs of increased lobbying.
17  There are three components to the expected 
marginal benefits of a policy change by a party.  We summarise each below with 
reference to equation (11a).
18 First, policy concessions made by party i have a direct 






).   Second, as policies 
are strategic complements, a policy change by party i will induce a policy change by 
the rival party j.  Hence, ceteris paribus, contributions to party i will alter expected 
                                                 
17  The equilibrium described here is consistent with the concept of ‘local truthfulness’. Given 
knowledge of its own contributions each party will announce policies to maximise its expected utility. 
From lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Proposition 1 of Grossman and Helpman (1994), 
the optimal policies of each party satisfy the following criteria:  
() () argmax
Kk i i i Φ     G                      k i, j Φ t, θ ∈= =    (B1) 
() () argmax
Kf k j j j Φ     U G            k i, j Φ t, θ ∈+ ==    (B2)   
() ( ) 1
f i jij ij US S E S S =Ω Π + −Ω Π − − = Π − −  
Condition (B1) implies that each party chooses the equilibrium tax rate and penalty rate are chosen to 
maximise its expected utility given the offered contributions from the firm. (B2) requires that the joint 
utilities of the firm and the political parties are maximised.   Performing appropriate substitutions into 










This condition tells us that the contribution are offered to equate the marginal cost of changing policy 
with the marginal effect on expected profits.  
   14






Ω  ΦΦ 
).  Finally, changes in policy by both parties 
alter welfare levels and hence the outcome of the election.  This electoral effect is 











.  As a first mover, the firm 
will take into account these electoral effects.  
Finally, for completeness it is useful to note that by total differentiation of 






> ).  Intuitively, political competition ensures that the firm must consider 
the electoral effects of paying  bribes to political parties.  Specifically, to offset the 
effects of political competition, the firm must secure more favourable policies from 
both parties.  Hence higher contributions to (say) party i are accompanied by higher 
contributions to the rival party.  Thus, ceteris paribus, bribes (contributions) are used 
to distort policies of both the incumbent and rival parties simultaneously.   
 
 
3.  Policies, Corruption and Political Competition 
Having defined the political equilibrium in this section we examine how the 
level of contributions and policy platforms of the parties change when the level of 
political competition varies.  We also investigate the effects of political competition 
on the level of petty corruption.  All proofs are presented in Appendix B. 
Recall that the parameter α is a measure of political bias.  A large α implies 
that the electoral prospects of party i are less effected by the welfare consequences of 
its policies.  Thus α may be used as a proxy for the intensity of political competition, 
with lower levels implying a more competitive environment.   
                                                                                                                                            
18 The same intuition holds for equation (11b).   15
We begin by considering the effects of political competition on policy 
positions. 
Proposition 1a  
If the returns to winning government (R) are sufficiently large, an increase in political 
bias for a party (i.e. a rise in α), results in both parties announcing less stringent 










  () ,
ii i j j j Φ t, Φ t, i j θθ == ≠  
The intuition for this result is straightforward. As the political advantage of 
party i  grows, there is less political competition.  Hence the political cost of lowering 
the stringency of environmental controls falls.   As a result, each of the political 
parties has less incentive to adopt welfare improving policies.  An alternative way of 
expressing this result is that the parties are completely self interested and only care 
about welfare from the perspective of political gain. Greater political bias for a party 
lowers the importance of improving welfare compared with procuring contributions 
from the firm.  Conversely, this implies that policy will become more stringent when 
political competition increases (i.e. α diminishes). 
Proposition 1b  
An increase in political competition results in a decrease in the level of emissions and 




An increase in political competition results in more stringent policy in terms of 
both the marginal fine and the tax rate.  This raises the costs of polluting for the firm, 
so that the level of emissions fall.  Hence political competition always leads to 
environmental improvements.  However, as Proposition (1c)  shows the effects of 
political competition on petty corruption and compliance levels may be ambiguous.   16
Proposition 1c 
When political competition increases, the effects on compliance levels and the 











An increase in political competition leads to a higher tax rate and a higher 
marginal fine (Proposition 1a).  Higher taxes increase the benefits from under-
reporting emissions.    This ‘evasion effect’ acts as an incentive for the firm to under-
report emissions. However, at the same time an increase in the fine dilutes the benefits 
of under-reporting.  This is  the ‘deterrent’ effect, which reduces the incentive to 
under-report emissions.  As these effects work in opposite directions, the overall 
effect of an increase in the level of political competition is ambiguous.  Similarly, the 
effects of political competition on the equilibrium bribe are determined by the change 
in compliance levels (v), and the marginal effects each policy instrument has on the 
bribe, which is in general ambiguous. In the special case when judicial institutions are 
weak so that the expected probability of being convicted is low, political competition 
induces higher levels of bribery and lower compliance.  This result is summarised in 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 1d 
When the exogenous prosecution rate (η) is sufficiently low and/or the costs 
associated with enforcement are sufficiently high, an increase in political competition 
will increase the level of under-reporting and the equilibrium bribe will be higher. 
(i.e.  0, 0 ,      
dv dB dC
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The intuition for this results rests upon the incentives for engaging in petty 
corruption.  When political competition increases, both the marginal fine and the tax 
rate increase. The effect this has on the level of petty corruption depends on the   17
relative size of the evasion and deterrent effects.  In the case where the enforcement 
infrastructure is weak (e.g. η small), an increase in the fine has little effect on the 
expected costs of being corrupt and hence the evasion effect dominates.   
The equilibrium bribe is also shaped by similar forces.  A higher tax rate 
implies that the firm will be willing to increase the bribe offer.  Conversely, higher 
expected penalties decrease the expected payoffs from petty corruption and thus 
decrease the equilibrium bribe.  Again, when the prosecution rate is low, the evasion 
effect dominates the deterrent effect so that the equilibrium bribe increases.  In this 
case, increased political competition, while leading to policy improvements, induces 
greater down-stream corruption. 
Proposition 2 
When the welfare costs of  environmental damage are sufficiently high, the policies of 
the political parties tend to converge:(i.e. 
ij Φ= Φ when γ
k is large k=(i,j)) 
When environmental policy has a sufficiently large effect on welfare, in 
equilibrium the parties adopt policies which are identical.  The intuition is 
straightforward.  When the welfare costs of a policy are large, so too are the electoral 
costs to the party of deviating from the welfare maximising equilibrium.  In such 
circumstances, the parties are able to insulate themselves from these costs by allowing 
their policies to converge (and thus offering the electorate no real choice between 
parties).  As noted below, this creates an environment where grand corruption can 
persist, even though the public care “sufficiently” about environmental damage. 
Corollary 1 
Even when the political system is at its most competitive (α=0), and the public are 
sufficiently sensitive to environmental damage, grand corruption may persist.   18
With greater political competition, deviations in policy from the welfare 
maximising level impose greater costs on the parties.  This effectively increases the 
weight that the parties place upon aggregate welfare relative to contributions and leads 
the parties to adopt more stringent policy.  Further, as political costs are higher, more 
of the lobbying dollar goes towards compensating the parties for the political costs.  
The persistence of grand corruption can be explained by the following.  First, the 
policy maker will always be prepared to accept a bribe, provided she is adequately 
compensated for the political costs.  Political competition forces the parties to attach a 
lower weight to contributions vis-à-vis aggregate welfare in determining their policy 
responses, however, this weight will not in general be zero.  Further, as  noted in 
Proposition 2, if the public sensitivity to environmental damage is sufficiently high, 
the parties set convergent policies. This simultaneously insulates them against the 
electoral effects of abandoning public welfare and perpetuates grand corruption.   
Taken together, these two results reveal that even when political competition is 
at its maximum, the firm still offers payments in exchange for less stringent policy.  
Thus, grand corruption persists.  Moreover, if the welfare effects of policy are large, 
the parties protect their relative political positions by setting policies which are 
identical to each other.  The firm and the parties find themselves in a position whereby 
they are insulated from the political ramifications of grand corruption, allowing the 
practice to persist. 
 
4.   Conclusion 
This paper presents a model where a polluting firm can use different forms of 
corruption and minimise the effect of environmental policy.  The model combines the 
earlier work of Fredriksson (1997; 1999; 2001), Grossman and Helpman (1994; 1996)   19
and Border and Sobel (1995).  The focus of the paper is on whether political 
competition has a role in combating environmental damage,  petty and grand 
corruption, and if so, under what circumstances. 
The results suggest that higher levels of political competition will lead to the 
adoption of more stringent environmental policy and higher fines for evading their 
effects.  Importantly, more stringent policy always reduces emission levels.  In this 
respect, the model suggests political competition to be important in achieving a 
reduction in environmental damage.  However, corruption in all of its forms has the 
capacity to temper the magnitude of this outcome. 
We find that political competition by no means guarantees the elimination of 
either form of corruption.  Where the prosecution rate is very low, as is likely where 
judicial institutions are weak, an increase in political competition will actually 
increase petty corruption.  This is because the gains from avoiding more stringent 
policy are large and the chances of being prosecuted for doing so are small.  Thus, 
even if penalties are severe, the overall enforcement system is ineffectual.   Such  
regimes will also see a rise in the amount of the down-stream bribe and the level of 
under-reporting.  
Grand corruption, which takes the form of contributions to each of the parties, 
may not be eliminated when political competition is at a maximum.  This is because, 
provided they are sufficiently compensated, policy makers are willing to trade off the 
welfare of citizens.   Further, if the public care deeply about environmental damage, 
policy matching by the parties minimises the electoral impacts of deviating from the 
welfare maximising level.  The model presented here thus provides an explanation for 
the circumstances under which  policy convergence will occur – a reason which to our 
knowledge is new to the literature.   20
There has been considerable debate about how corruption is defined.  Our 
results indicate the importance of this debate.  On the one hand, political competition 
unambiguously brings about more stringent environmental policy and better 
environmental outcomes.  This implies that political competition forces politicians to 
better consider the welfare of the citizens they purport to represent.  This outcome 
may be taken to imply that  policy makers have thus become less corrupt.  However, 
at the same time, we find that there are circumstances where the level of non-
compliance (under-reporting) and the bribes paid to both policy makers and   
bureaucrats either persist or increase when political competition is strong.  If 
corruption is measured by the size of bribes, one  must conclude that corruption levels 
have increased.  Overall, political competition yields an environment where policy 
makers are more sensitive to the welfare of citizens and thus  set policies that are 
closer to the welfare maximising equilibrium.  At the same time, if the enforcement 
mechanisms are weak, political leaders may be powerless to stop petty corruption and 
their efforts to improve public welfare lead to a more corrupt bureaucracy.  
Despite the fact that we examine the effect of political competition in a 
simplified setting, the results are instructive in considering the complexities that 
surround the issue of corruption.  The effects of political competition on corruption, 
even in this model, are not unambiguous.  In particular, they are sensitive to 
exogenous factors such as the quality of the judiciary and upon how corruption is 
defined.   Several useful extensions are suggested.  First, political competition, as 
defined in this paper, is a reduction in the incumbent government’s ability to ignore 
the welfare consequences of its policies.  A worthwhile extension would be to allow 
for more complex political systems.  There is a vast literature detailing the nature of 
political competition and the inclusion of a more complex system of political   21
determination may yield interesting results.  The model here is also restricted to the 
analysis of an incumbent party and a single rival.  A clear extension would be to allow 
for a larger number of challengers.  Similarly, environmental interests may also be 
represented by special interest groups and could, in the same manner as the firm, 
attempt to influence policy decisions by making payments to incumbent and rival 
policies. 
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Appendix A 
This section details some useful properties of the equilibrium arising in the firm-
inspector interaction. 
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e e e e e e ee e e ee J J J J J J ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ and , 0 , 0 > > < <
19, ensuring a unique and stable 
solution. This ensures the determinant of the coefficient matrix, defined as  
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It is assumed that  e e e e J J ˆ ˆ ˆ > by a sufficient amount to ensure 





















which follows directly from the properties (4) and (5) 
                                                 
19  e e ee J J ˆ > requires  v
h
e e G ∂
∂
∂
λ ∂ > ∂ ∂ ˆ
2 2  which is assumed.   26
 
Appendix B 
Expanding terms in (8a) and (8b), using  (11a, b): 
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These conditions also assure that the determinant of the coefficient matrix is positive: 
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where, 







α ργ ρ γ
 ∂Π Φ ∂Π
=− − + + − − <  ∂Φ Φ ∂Φ 
  when R is large. 
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=− − − − + − − <  ∂Φ Φ ∂Φ 
 when R is large. 
          ( A 5 )  
and,   27
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From properties 2 and 5, in Appendix A  0 and 0 < θ < d
de
dt
de .   As 
0 and 0 < α
θ < α d
d
d
dt , then   0
de dt de d de
dd d t d d
θ
αα α θ
=+ > . 
 
Proposition 1c 
a.  When political competition increases, the effect on under-reporting is 








dv dv dt dv d
dd t dd d
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b.    
dB dB dt dB d dB dv
dd t d d dd v d
θ
αα θ αα
=++   (A7) 
 
using  Proposition (1a),  0, 0, 0
dB dt dB d dB dv
and








Thus, the sign of (A7) is ambiguous.   28
 
Proposition 1d 
dv dv dt dv d








<  if the first term dominates since  () ˆ 0
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Expanding these equations, it is evident that 
dv
dα








occurs  when   θ θ e e J J ˆ and are very small in size.  This occurs when  η is small in 
magnitude.
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An identical argument establishes that  0
dB
dα
< as η→0 or C(θ) is sufficiently large. 
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1   
Let political competition be at the  maximum (α=0), 0, 0
ij SS >> : 
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=+ + − +  ∂Φ ∂Φ Φ ∂Φ 
  (A8) 
where 








.  The sign of the RHS of (A8) will depend on the sign of A.  We 
therefore begin by  considering equilibrium contributions in 3 cases: A = 0, A > 0 and 
A<0 and show that when 
i γ is large, then A=0 and hence that  , 0
ij SS> . 








implying that an interior solution exists and contributions are always paid.  Suppose 
next that  A>0, and let 







.  In this case by the   29
FOC in (A8) S
i = 0.  However,  when S










 which implies that party i sets policies at the welfare maximising level 
denoted :  Φ
i=Φ
w .  Furthermore  A>0, implies that 




w.  But since no party has an incentive to set policies which are more 
stringent than the welfare maximising policies, it follows that Φ
j ≤ Φ
w.  This implies 
that A ≤ 0, which contradicts the assumption that A > 0.  Hence A > 0 is not feasible 
when γ
i is sufficiently high. QED. 
By an identical argument it also follows that A < 0 is not feasible when γ
j is 
sufficiently high.  Hence A = 0, which implies that  Φ
j = Φ




           When political competition is at a maximum (α=0), and γ
i (γ
j) is sufficiently 
high, it has been shown that A=0.  This implies that the policies of the parties must 
converge under such circumstances (i.e. A = 0).  Moreover when A=0, then the 
conditions for an interior equilibrium of (A8) are satisfied hence  , 0
ij SS> . 
                                                                                                                                            
20 Note for Proposition 1a to hold, η≠0.   